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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-PROHIBITION OF
ABORTION REFERRAL SERVICE ADVERTISING HELD UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
Commercial advertising is omnipresent in today's society be-
cause it provides information to coordinate our material wants with
our productive capabilities.' An important role of the first amend-
ment 2 is to guarantee the widest possible flow of information 3 so that
the public will -make intelligent decisions on matters affecting the
general welfare.4 Consumer decisions based on advertising deeply
affect this general welfare. Nevertheless, although the first amend-
ment generally protects the public's right to be informed and the
speaker's right to be heard on "public issues," purely private com-
mercial advertising has not traditionally received first amendment
protection.
In Bigelow v. Virginia,5 the Supreme Court modified its non-
protection of commercial advertising, and declared that an adver-
tiser's first amendment interests were to be balanced against reason-
' In 1973 over one million people were employed in the advertising industry and more
than $25 billion was spent on advertising. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 766,772 (1974). In R. HARRIS & A. SELDEN, ADVERTISING AND THE PUBLIC
251 (1962) it was stated:
Advertising can raise living standards by spreading knowledge of desirable
commodities and services and sharpening the incentives to acquire them. It is mis-
guided to condemn it for encouraging emulation or for emphasizing consumption.
2 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). The Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged the
first amendment's role as furthering the free flow of information. See, e.g., New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02
(1952); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,250 (1936). For commentary examining
the relationship between advertising and the first amendment, see Redish, The First Amendment
in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429
(1971); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1191 (1965).
4 Professor Emerson has delineated four functions of the first amendment freedom of
expression: (1) freedom of expression stimulates self-realization and development of charac-
ter; (2) freedom of expression is invaluable in attaining the truth; (3) freedom of expression
allows all members of society to participate in the democratic decision-making process through
open debate; and (4) freedom of expression aids the achievement of the compromises
necessary for the operation of a viable democracy. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
5 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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able governmental interests. In so balancing, the Court found that a
state's interest in prohibiting abortion advertising was unreasonable,
largely because the abortion agencies were located outside of the
state, and therefore beyond the scope of its police powers. In a
vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, viewed
the advertisement as purely commercial, without any first amend-
ment interests, and subject to reasonable regulation.
I
PRIOR LAW: THE COMMERCIAL-SPEECH DOCTRINE
In 1942, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,6 the owner of a submarine
exhibit was warned that advertising handbills could not be distrib-
uted in the streets unless they contained a political or religious
message. Frustrated in his attempts to advertise, the owner tried to
evade the ordinance by printing a new handbill that contained
information concerning his submarine on one side, and a protest
against the prohibitive ordinance on the other side. To check this
evasion, the Supreme Court formulated the "commercial-speech"
doctrine, declaring that the first amendment "imposes no ... re-
straint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. '' 7
In subsequent cases, the Court defined "commercial speech" as
6 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
7 Id. at 54. The Chrestensen Court never explained why commercial speech was not
entitled to first amendment protection. It did, however, explain why the doctrine was em-
ployed:
If that evasion were successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast adver-
tising leaflets on the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to
achieve immunity from the law's command.
316 U.S. at 55. In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), Justice Douglas,
concurring, said of Chrestensen: "The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not
survived reflection." Id. at 514. In Bigelow, reference was made to doubts of at least six
members of the Court as to the remaining vitality of the commercial-speech doctrine: "There
is some doubt concerning whether the 'commercial speech' distinction announced in Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen... retains continuing validity." 421 U.S. at 820 n.6, citing Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall & Powell, JJ.). The majority opinion in Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (discussed in text accompanying notes 14-16 infra), was termed
"a disturbing enlargement of the 'commercial speech' doctrine.. ." by Chief Justice Burger.
Id. at 393 (dissenting opinion). In the same case, Justice Douglas stated "I believe that
commercial materials also have First Amendment protection." Id. at 398 (dissenting opinion,
Douglas, J.). And Justice Stewart, also in Pittsburgh Press, stated:
Whatever validity the Chrestensen case may still retain when limited to its own facts, it
certainly does not stand for the proposition that the advertising pages of a newspaper
are outside the protection given the newspaper by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
Id. at 401 (dissenting opinion, Stewart & Douglas, JJ.) (footnote omitted).
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speech primarily motivated by profit.8 However, this profit-motive
test, which focuses only on the rights of the speaker, was not consis-
tently applied. 9
Recognizing that no logical limits existed for the commercial-
speech doctrine in a society built upon private enterprise, the Court
' See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943), where the Court distin-
guished the fund-raising activities of Jehovah's Witnesses from commercial speech, thus
framing the "primary-purpose" test: "[Their] selling activities [were] 'merely incidental and
collateral' to their 'main object which was to preach . . .' Id., quoting State v. Mead, 230 Iowa
1217, 1220, 300 N.W. 523, 524 (1941).
In the Chrestensen case before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, (122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1941)), Judge Frank argued, in dissent, for a balancing of first amendment interests against
state interests, and declared that, because Chrestensen had been motivated by profit to protest
the statute and because alternative means of advertising existed, the handbill was entitled to
less than absolute first amendment protection. Id. at 517-26. To date,Judge Frank's reasoning
in Chrestensen remains the most thorough judicial justification for the commercial-speech
doctrine. Essentially, Judge Frank saw the first amendment as only protecting "free expression
of ideas" (Id. at 522) and "the right to disseminate opinion." (Id. at 524). Judge Frank argued
that to extend first amendment protection to advertising because it is a form of speech
would be to "thingify" the words "free speech" and "free expression," and t6become
forgetful of the vital ideas-"the defense of liberty" and the functioning of "the
processes of popular rule"--for which they stand.
Id. at 525 (footnote omitted).
There is highly respected academic authority for Judge Frank's position. Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn has described the first amendment as protecting only "ideas" relating
to self-government and being at odds with private enterprise. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM(1960). Professor Emerson has stated:
Communications in connection with commercial transactions generally relate to a
separate sector of social activity involving the system of property rights rather than
free expression. The principles governing commercial speech, and the relations
between this sector and the area of free expression, have never been worked out....
Up to the present, the problem of differentiating between commercial and other
communication has not in practice proved to be a serious one.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 948-49 n.93 (1963).
One point should be emphasized in connection with the Chrestensen case. At that time, first
amendment jurisprudence was still in its infancy, and the first amendment was often consid-
ered "absolute." Thus, the decision facing the Court was full protection or no protection.
Indeed, Judge Frank characterized this in Chrestensen as a "ruthless dogma fight to the finish
between the city's so-called 'police power' ... and the constitutional right of the individual to
free speech and free expression of ideas." 122 F.2d at 522.
9 Cf., e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,641-45 (1951); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 531 (1945).
In Breard, the Court considered a statute prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of
magazine subscriptions. Although the solicitors had a primary motive of profit, the Court
declined to directly invoke the commercial-speech doctrine: "We agree that the fact that
periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment. The
selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature." 341 U.S. at 642 (footnote
omitted). Nevertheless, the Court found no infringement of freedom of expression and
upheld the statute. Id. at 642-45. In Thomas, the Court struck down a statute barring unregis-
tered labor organizers from speaking in Texas. The Court stated: "The idea is not sound
therefore that the First Amendment's safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or
economic activity." Id. at 531. Both cases disclaim the commercial-speech doctrine, yet one
reached a commercial-speech result, while the other did not.
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began to reexamine this doctrine,' 0 and in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan," the Court ruled that an advertisement communicating
opinion and information on public issues was entitled to full first
amendment protection. This holding appeared to limit the com-
mercial-speech doctrine to "purely commercial" advertisements, and
to extend constitutional protection to commercial messages convey-
ing valuable information to the public.' 2 Although the Court's
"public-interest" test emphasized the public's right to know, as op-
posed to the speaker's right to be heard, its focus on content does
have dangerous implications for freedom of expression.'
3
10 In 1959, the Supreme Court, striking down a strict-liability statute prohibiting the
possession of obscene books, noted that the fact that books are sold does not strip them of
all first amendment protection. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
11 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the City Commissioner of Birmingham, Alabama,
brought suit against a newspaper for libel based on an advertisement accusing the Montgom-
ery police of brutality and racism. The profit-motive test of Chrestensen had assumed that
commercial speech did not "communicate information or disseminate opinion." 316 U.S. at
54-55. In Sullivan, however, the Court was clearly faced with an advertisement that did
communicate opinion and information. The Sullivan Court therefore distinguished the adver-
tisement before it as being more than "purely commercial" and developed a supplemental
"public-interest" test for identifying commercial speech deserving of first amendment protec-
tion. Thus, the Court extended first amendment protection to the advertisement because it
"communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses,
and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public concern." 376 U.S. at 266. To afford adequate protection for
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" discussion of public issues (Id. at 270), the Court
required public officials to prove actual malice (knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity
prior to publication) to recover any libel damages. Id. at 283.
12 By denying protection on the basis of the speaker's motives alone, a strict profit-motive
test unduly sacrifices the public's right to be informed. The Court has recognized in the past
not only the right to speak but also the right to listen. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
The Sullivan public-interest test attempts to grant first amendment protection on the basis
of widespread audience reaction and controversy, as well as the motives of the speaker. See 376
U.S. at 266, 270-71; note I1 supra.
'" See note 12 supra. The implication of the public-interest test is that those messages that
the Court deems to be uninteresting, uncontroversial, or uninformative may be totally ban-
ned. This is directly contrary to accepted first amendment doctrine barring all content
restraints on freedom of expression. See note 36 infra. As Justice Black declared in New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971):
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection
it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the
governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform
the people.
Id at 717 (concurring opinion).
The public-interest test allows the government to censor unpopular advertisements. Yet,
critics have noted that the values of advertisements merely reflect the American value system
itself: "Sociologically speaking, it would be impossible for advertising to be in conflict with the
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More recently, in Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Commis-
sion,'14 the Court upheld an application of the commercial-speech
doctrine to suppress advertisements promoting illegal sex discrimi-
nation in hiring. In dicta, however, the Court suggested that com-
mercial advertising for a legal activity might be entitled to some, if
not full, first amendment protection.' 5 The profit motive behind the
advertisement was the crucial factor in Pittsburgh Press, for the Court
specifically stated that the newspaper nevertheless was free to advo-
cate sex discrimination in its editorials.
16
II
Bigelow v. Virginia AND THE
COMMERCIAL-SPEECH DOCTRINE
On February 8, 1971, Jeffrey Bigelow, editor of the Virginia
Weekly, ran an advertisement for a New York abortion referral
service,' 7 in violation of Virginia's broad statutory ban on the en-
value system .... It is the value system which determines the nature and significance of social
institutions, not the other way around." N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1962, at 42, col. 4. Any
repression of advertising, then, would seem to be actually aimed at repressing specific values.
14 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (sexually discriminatory want-ads enjoined by the Pittsburgh
Human Relations Commission).
15 The relevant dicta appears in 413 U.S. at 388-89. Under this formulation, presumably
noncommercial speech advocating illegal activity would still retain greater protection than
commercial speech and would be subject to a more traditional first amendment analysis. See
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (197 1). Using illegality as ajustification for
shackling speech, however, has dangerous implications for all freedom of expression. As
Justice Stewart noted in his dissent in Pittsburgh Press:
After this decision, I see no reason why government cannot force a newspaper
publisher to conform in the same way in order to achieve other goals thought socially
desirable. And if government can dictate the layout of a newspaper's classified
advertising pages today, what is there to prevent it from dictating the layout of the
news pages tomorrow?
413 U.S. at 403.
Moreover, illegality has little to do with the public-interest aspect of the advertisement. In
Pittsburgh Press, it was suggested in dicta that an advertisement reading "Prostitutes Wanted"
could be suppressed. 413 U.S. at 388. Yet, prostitution is legal in Nevada. 9 NEv. Ray. STAT
§ 269.175 (1973). In 1971, local county commissioners licensed Nevada's first legal brothel. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1971, at 41, col. 3. Presumably, an advertisement for Nevada brothels would
not be suppressible under the Court's stated rationale because of its public interest and the
legality of the advertised activity. The Court's attitude towards prostitution in Pittsburgh Press,
however, suggests it might suppoirt a ban on such advertising. One can infer therefore that the
illegal-legal distinction, like the commercial-speech doctrine and public-interest test, does not
isolate the value the Court is actually testing.
16 413 U.S. at 391.
17 The advertisement, appearing in the VIRGINIA WEEKLY, Feb. 8, 1971, at 2, in relevant
part stated:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
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couragement of abortion. 18 After being charged, tried, and con-
victed, 19 Bigelow appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, which
affirmed his conviction.2 0 Summarily disposing of Bigelow's statuto-
ry 2' and first amendment overbreadth defenses,2 2 the majority opin-
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED




New York, N.Y. 10022
1s At that time the statute, Act of March 14, 1878, ch. 311, § 8, [1877-78] Va. Acts of
Assembly 281, as amended, 4 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (1975), provided:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation
of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of
abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
In response to Bigelow's appeal to the United States Supreme Court on overbreadth grounds,
the statute was amended. Act of April 10, 1972, ch. 725, [1972] Va. Acts of Assembly 1019
(effective July 1, 1972), to provide:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation
of any publication, or through the use of a referral agency for profit, or in any other
manner, encourage or promote the processing of an abortion or miscarriage to be
performed in this State which is prohibited under this article, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
In 1975, Virginia revamped its entire criminal codification. However, this statute, in substan-
tially the same language, can be found at 4 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (1975).
19 Bigelow was charged with violating the statute on May 13, 1971. He was tried and
convicted in the County Court of Albermarle County. In a trial de novo before the Circuit
Court of that County, he waived a jury, and was again convicted. The Circuit Court rejected
Bigelow's first amendment claims without comment. He was sentenced to pay a fine of
$500.00, $350.00 of which was suspended pending no further violations. 421 U.S. at 813-14.
At this time, abortion referral agencies for profit were legal in New York. Id. at 822 n.8.
20 Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972). The court voted 4-2 to
affirm, with Judges I'Anson and Cochran dissenting.
2 Bigelow argued that the advertisement was merely informational and thus not within
the scope of the "encourage or prompt" language of the statute. The majority disagreed: "The
language of the advertisement clearly exceeded an informational status when it offered to
make all arrangements for immediate placement in accredited hospitals and clinics at low
cost." Idat 193, 191 S.E.2d at 174. See note 17 supra.
2 The court held that because Bigelow's activities were purely commercial, traditional
first amendment overbreadth doctrine (See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963))
would not apply. Instead, Bigelow was denied standing to raise "the hypothetical rights of
those in the non-commercial zone." 213 Va. at 198, 191 S.E.2d at 178.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court overruled the Virginia Supreme Court's
ruling denying defendant standing to raise overbreadth claims, and, indeed, found the statute
overbroad despite subsequent amendment. 421 U.S. 809, 815-18 (1975). See note 18 supra.
Because of the first amendment's preferred status (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949)),
standing requirements to challenge overbreadth have been traditionally more relaxed when
dealing with first amendment issues. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
It is likely that the lengthy discussion of overbreadth inBigelow was due to Virginia's insistent
clash with settled law. The Supreme Court found overbreadth because of "the statute's
potential for sweeping and improper applications." 421 U.S. at 817. For example, the original
statute would clearly reach a husband's "encouraging" his wife to get an abortion. See note 18
supra. Because the statute had been amended, however, the Court rested its decision on other
grounds. 421 U.S. at 818.
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ion found that the advertisement was commercial speech, 23 and
therefore not entitled to any first amendment protection.24 The
statute was held to be a valid exercise of the state's police power.25
On the first appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the case was
remanded for consideration in light of Roe v. Wade,2 0 which held
that, within broad limits, a woman's constitutional right to privacy
guaranteed her right to an abortion. The Virginia Supreme Court
reaffirmed Bigelow's conviction, 27 stating that this was strictly "a
First Amendment case"2 8 and was therefore unaffected by Roe.
Although the advertisement in Bigelow was primarily motivated
by profit, and therefore "commercial,"29 the United States Supreme
Court on a further appeal also applied the Sullivan "public-interest"
test.3 0 Because theBigelow advertisement "contained factual material
of clear 'public interest,' "31 it was granted first amendment protec-
23 The Virginia Supreme Court found that because the advertisement offered abortion
referrals "at low cost," it was a "patently" commercial advertisement. 213 Va. at 193, 191
S.E.2d at 175. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
24 The court relied heavily on the case of United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 204 (4th Cir.
1972), in which the government was granted an injunction against racially discriminatory
housing advertisements in a newspaper. Hunter, in turn, relied on Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942), for the proposition that the first amendment did not restrain the
government from prohibiting "purely commercial advertising." 459 F.2d at 211.
25 Once the first amendment objections were surmounted, the Virginia Supreme Court.
easily found a legitimate state interest behind the statute:
It is clearly within the police power of the state to enact reasonable measures to
ensure that pregnant women in Virginia who decide to have abortions come to their
decisions without the commercial advertising pressure usually incidental to the sale of
a box of soap powder. And the state is rightfully interested in seeing that Virginia
women who do decide to have abortions obtain proper medical care and do not fall
into the hands of those interested only in financial gain, and not in the Welfare of the
patient.
213 Va. at 196, 191 S.E.2d at 176.
26 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Both Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 170
(1973), found that the right to privacy was a fundamental right, which could only be abridged
if the state could show a compelling interest. 410 U.S. at 156.
27 Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
28 Id. at 342, 200 S.E.2d at 680. The Virginia Supreme Court insisted that neither
abortion case "mentioned the subject of abortion advertising" and that this was strictly "a First
Amendment," and not an abortion case. Id. The United States Supreme Court agreed. 421
U.S. at 815 n.5.
29 421 U.S. at 818. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, termed the advertisement a "classic
commercial proposition directed towards the exchange of services rather than the exchange of
ideas." Id. at 831. In New York, profit-based abortion referral agencies were eventually
prohibited. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4501 (McKinney 1971); S.P.S. Consultants, Inc. v.
Lefkowitz, 333 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); State v. Abortion Information Agency, Inc., 69
Misc. 2d 825, 323 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1971). Justice Rehnquist found it incongruous that
New York could prohibit such advertising for resident abortion agencies, but that Virginia's
ban was struck down. 421 U.S. at 832-34.
30 See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
31 421 U.S. at 822.
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tion. In so doing, the Court dramatically expanded the definition of
possible first amendment interests served by advertising. The adver-
tisement in the Sullivan case sought to raise funds for a civil rights
group by condemning racism in the South. 32 It was thus a patently
political advertisement for a political group. The Bigelow advertise-
ment, on the other hand, offered abortion at a price. 33 It was thus a
more purely commercial advertisement for a distinctly apolitical
medical service. In Sullivan, the Court found a political tinge to an
advertisement that "expressed opinion, recited grievances, pro-
tested claimed abuses. ' 34 In Bigelow, the Court found a "public
interest":
The advertisement.. . did more than simply propose a commer-
cial transaction. .. . Portions of its message, most prominently the.
lines, "Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no resi-
dency requirements," involve the exercise of the freedom of
communicating information and disseminating opinion.
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed informa-
tion of potential interest and value to a diverse audience-not only
to readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those
with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject
matter or the law of another State and its development, and to
readers seeking reform in Virginia.
35
12 See notes 11-13 supra.
33 States usually prohibit any advertising by health professionals. See Semler v. Oregon
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); notes 80-84 and accompanying text infra.
34 376 U.S. at 266.
35 421 U.S. at 822.
In dealing with commercial speech, the Court has not yet openly recognized that product
information is worthy of first amendment protection in and of itself. Justice Blackmun's
general language in the majority opinion may seem to indicate otherwise, but implicit in his
statement that the advertisement "did more than simply propose a commercial transaction" is
the notion that such a simple proposition would still be unworthy of first amendment protec-
tion. In contrast to the Supreme Court treatment, in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S.* 842 (1969), the court of
appeals specifically recognized that cigarette commercials implicitly set forth a public position
on the issue of cigarettes and health, and thus were subject to first amendment considera-
tions. "[C~igarette commercials 'present the point of view that smoking is "socially acceptable
and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a rich full life;'" and, as such, invoke the [first
amendment] fairness doctrine." Id. at 1086, quoting Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d
381 (1967). See note 12 supra.
In other contexts, the Court has gone so far as to provide nonverbal "symbolic" speech
comprehensive first amendment protection. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)
(American flag with peace symbol is proper exercise of freedom of expression by virtue of
being sufficiently "communicative"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student's first amendment right to protest the Vietnam War by wearing
black arm-band upheld). However, the Court's attitude towards the nonverbal aspects of
advertisements (one of implicit disapproval) closely resembles the condemnation of nonra-
tional persuasion in advertisements generally in V. PACKARD, THE HiDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
At least one observer has questioned the wisdom of insisting on a strictly verbal or written
1976]
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Possibly, under Chrestensen, the information in Bigelow's advertise-
ment also would be discounted as evasive. Clearly, by including such
factors as information satisfying one's "general curiosity about...
the subject matter or the law of another State" as part of the new
public-interest test, the Court expanded its first amendment protec-
tion of advertising. The public-interest test, however, remains as
subject-matter oriented as the profit-motive test, and therefore is
potentially inimical to freedom of expression.
36
Bigelow also limited the application of the commercial-speech
doctrine when advertisements for legal activities were involved, hold-
ing that such advertisements were entitled to at least "some degree
of First Amendment protection. 37 In so holding, the Court adopted
a position suggested in dicta in Pittsburgh Press, namely that a "First
Amendment interest ... served by advertising ... might arguably
outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation. '38
Pittsburgh Press, however, had also stressed that in addition to the
illegality of the advertised activity, the government restrictions in-
volved in that case were only incidental to regulating economic
activity and were as narrowly tailored as possible.
39
framework for analyzing information. See H. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 200-06
(1964). And Justice Douglas has stated:
Nor, in my view, should commercial content be controlling. The language of the First
Amendment does not except speech directed at private economic decisionmaking.
Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important than political expres-
sion. When immersed in a free flow of commercial information, private sector
decisionmaking is at least as effective an institution as are our various governments in
furthering the social interest in obtaining the best general allocation of resources. W.
Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis 249-256 (1961); A. Braff, Mi-
croeconomic Analysis 259-75 (1969); R. Dorfman, Prices and Markets 128-136 (3d ed.
1967).
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905-06 (1971), denying cert. to 438 F.2d 433 (2d
Cir.) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
36 Constitutional protection does not turn upon "the truth, popularity, or social utility of
ideas and beliefs which are offered." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963). Accord, N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964). The government may regulate as to time,
place, and manner of speech, but not as to content. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
576 (1941). In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Court declared: "[A]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95. Accord, Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945). In Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Bigelow, he stated: "If
the Court's decision does indeed turn upon its conclusion that the advertisement ... was
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the subject of the advertisement ought to
make no difference." 421 U.S. at 831.
The Court's position, then, is somewhat ironic in light of its condemnation of Virginia for
"really asserting an interest in regulating what Virginians may hear orread about the New York
services." 421 U.S. at 827 (emphasis in original).
37 Id. at 821.
38 413 U.S. at 389. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
39 413 U.S. at 389, 391.
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Bigelow therefore invites future assessments of the degree of
commerciality within a particular speech, but its modified commer-
cial-speech doctrine makes no reference to the "narrowly tailored"
analysis of Pittsburgh Press,40 nor to the distinction between inciden-
tal regulation and direct prohibition of an activity or the advertise-
ment thereof.41 If prohibitions and regulations are equivalent, and
if advertising of a regulated activity can itself be regulated, or pro-
hibited, then the underlying legality of the advertised activity actu-
ally accounts for very little first amendment protection. 42 The prob-
lem inBigelow is that the Court presents New York abortion agencies
not only as legal, but as beyond Virginia's jurisdiction, and therefore
totally nonregulatable by Virginia.43 If this is so, then the illegal-
legal activity distinction, without more, is not very helpful in deter-
mining how much first amendment protection a particular adver-
tisement will receive once it receives "some" protection.
40 The overbreadth argument ofBigelow nevertheless is related to the "narrowly tailored"
or "least drastic means" analysis of Pittsburgh Press. In Bigelow, when discussing overbreadth,
the issue was standing-whether or not the plaintiff could raise the hypothetical first amend-
ment rights of others to constitutionally impeach the statute. 421 U.S. at 815-16. In Pittsburgh
Press, the ordinance was upheld because, among other reasons, it was "narrowly drawn to
prohibit placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements." 413 U.S. at 391. In other
words, there were no alternative methods of achieving the government's goal less burdensome
to individual freedoms. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960). However, by striking down Virginia's total ban on abortion advertising and
simultaneously suggesting that advertisements can be reasonably regulated, while failing to
distinguish regulation from prohibition, the Court in Bigelow raises doubts about the applica-
bility of a "least drastic means" analysis in future commercial speech cases. Cf. Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
Once the Court has found a valid first amendment interest, it normally affords this
interest the fullest protection possible consistent with a substantial governmental interest. See
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968). As Justice Black stated in NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 79-80 (1964)
(concurring opinion):
I cannot accept my Brother HARLAN'S view [in dissent] that the abridgment of
speech and press here does not violate the First Amendment because other methods
of communication are left open. This reason for abridgment strikes me as being on a
par with holding that governmental suppressi6n of a newspaper in a city would not
violate the First Amendment because there continue to be radio and television
stations. First Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degrees
than by one fell swoop.
41 Although the Virginia statute prohibited "prompting an abortion," the Court charac-
terized the statute as a regulatory measure only, and used a "reasonable-regulation" test as its
constitutional standard, thus implicitly equating this prohibition with regulation. 421 U.S. at
826. This distinction was not crucial to the result reached in Bigelow; nevertheless, it is
important to future balancing of first amendment interests against governmental interests. See
text accompanying notes 46-59 infra.
42 Judge Clark, speaking for the majority of the Second Circuit in Chrestensen, considered
the distinction between regulation and prohibition crucial to affording commercial advertising
proper first amendment protection. 122 F.2d 511, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1941).
43 421 U.S. at 822-25.
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Despite theBigelow Court's desire to protect freedom of expres-
sion in this specific instance and dictum stating that "commercial
activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of
expression . . . ,,,44 it is clear that the public-interest test and the
legality of the activity, at best, can serve only to provide some, as
opposed to full, first amendment protection to commercial speech.
45
III
BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTEREST
In Bigelow, having found a first amendment interest to be pro-
tected, Justice Blackmun announced the appropriate balancing test:
"Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable
regulation that serves a legitimate public interest. '46 Even for regu-
lation aimed primarily at conduct, the standard normally used to
counterbalance incidental abridgment of freedom of expression re-
quires that the statute in question be not only reasonable, but also
narrowly tailored to the particular governmental interest. 47 There-
fore, in examining a regulation directly aimed at freedom of expres-
sion, i.e., a particular message, such as abortion, a more rigorous
balancing standard should be necessary. 48 Indeed, in both Pittsburgh
44 Id. at 818, quoting Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966).
45 Bigelow advanced justifications for granting commercial speech "some" protection, but
did not explain why such speech should be given less than full protection. Id. at 818-25.
46 421 U.S. at 826 (emphasis added).
47 In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court announced the following
criteria for evaluating the governmental interest in regulating conduct that has both "speech"
and "nonspeech" elements:
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the
Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subor-
dinating; paramount; cogent; strong. ... [A] government regulation is sufficiently
justified... if it furthers. .. [a] substantial governmental interest; if the... interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
Id. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
48 C. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 221 (1960):
Most laws suppressing free speech ... have a rational basis, in the sense that some
rational men may believe their enforcement would do good. The suppression of free
speech seems quite evidently rational to all but a small fraction of humanity. The
framers of the First Amendment were not foolish enough to be unaware of this. They
committed our nation to take a chance on a higher rationality.
In Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), a statute prohibiting screen nudity at
drive-in movie theaters was struck down. Speaking for a 7-2 majority, Justice Powell stated:
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public
from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others,
the First Amendment strictly limits its power.
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Press and Lehman v. Shaker Heights,49 cited by the Court in support of
the reasonableness standard, the first amendment interests were
compromised only because of equally compelling, but conflicting,
interests. 50 Moreolver, in Sullivan, upon which Bigelow relied to test
for a first amendment interest, the compelling-interest standard was
implicit in the Court's requirement that only "actual malice" could
override the newspaper's and the public's interest in freedom of
expression. 51 Yet Bigelow's first amendment interest, unlike those
above, was subject to "reasonable regulation."
The notion that advertising can be reasonably regulated con-
fuses the business aspects of advertising with its speech aspects.
Business activity is normally subject to reasonable economic regula-
tion, but the weak due process standard traditionally used in that
context is insufficient to limit directly first amendment freedoms.
52
• . . We hold . . . that the present ordinance does not satisfy the rigorous
constitutional standards that apply when government attempts to regulate expres-
sion.
Id- at 209, 217. See also Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (right to privacy
necessary to override freedom of speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (only
compelling interest can justify limiting first amendment freedoms); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (compelling interest necessary to encroach upon.freedom of association).
49 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
SO In Pittsburgh Press, the first amendment interest was abridged only because the gov-
ernment was trying to prevent invidious sex discrimination, an interest that is arguably
compelling. 413 U.S. at 387-89. Cf.. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Lehman,
the Court upheld a city -policy of not selling advertising space in buses to campaigning
politicians. Because theLehman Court found that the complaint "[did] not rise to the dignity of
a First Amendment violation," the case provides minimal guidance for determining which
balancing test to use with the first amendment. 418 U.S. at 304. Furthermore, the Court
ultimately rested its decision on the rights of the commuters, as a captive audience, to privacy,
free of the "blare of political propaganda"--a compelling interest with roots in the first
amendment itself. Id.
Where, however, first amendment and equal protection interests intersect, the govern-
ment almost never prevails. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (footnotes
omitted):
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas .. "
This statement also bears on the public-interest test, discussed in notes 11-13 supra. If there is
an "equality of status in the field of ideas," it is incongruous to select some forms of expression
and protect them for their public interest, while rejecting others.
" See note 11 supra. See also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1975)
(rigorous constitutional standards apply when government attempts to regulate expression);
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972) (only a substantial government interest can
restrict first amendment freedoms); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (no substan-
tial regulatory interest in prohibiting advocacy of racial equality).
52 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,530 (1945).Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court,
declared:
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In light of the Court's designation of the advertisement in Bigelow as
"pure speech, ' 3 it would appear that the government is severely
restricted in regulating the content of advertising.54 Yet a due pro-
cess standard has been employed instead of a more rigorous first
amendment standard.55 Therefore, although Bigelow purports to
recognize that "commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for
narrowing the protection of expression,' 56 what has happened, in
fact, is that the unexamined taint of "commercial speech" has been
allowed to attach to the first amendment interest. What the Court
has granted in terms of protection, by limiting the commercial-
speech doctrine and affording "some" first amendment protection,
it has withdrawn by insisting on a due process standard of balancing
what would have been applicable even without any first amendment
interest.
57
For these reasons any attempt to restrict [first amendment] liberties must be
justified by clear public interest .... The rational connection between the remedy
provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation
against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice.
Id. See note 48 supra.
53 421 U.S. at 817. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974): "Although neither written
nor spoken, an act may be sufficiently communicative to invoke the protection of the First
Amendment .... Id. at 589 (concurring opinion, White, J.). If communication is the key to
first amendment protection, it is difficult to see why the sexually discriminatory information in
the Pittsburgh Press advertisements was not sufficiently communicative while abortion informa-
tion in Bigelow in effect was. In Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), the Court
provided first amendment protection because the "message was direct, likely to be un-
derstood, and within the contours of the First Amendment." Id. at 415.
'4 See notes 47-48, 53 supra. The federal government, in policing advertising in the
national press incidental to its economic regulation of interstate trade, empowers the Federal
Trade Commission to regulate only for truth in product advertising. As the least drastic
method of preventing consumer fraud, this test is acceptable even under rigorous standards.
Compared to the profit-motive or public-interest test, it is by far the least intrusive upon first
amendment freedoms because it remains indifferent to any particular subject matter. See
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (calculated falsehoods not subject to first
amendment protection). See also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Grover, 438 F.2d 433 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
The authority empowering this agency to test national advertisements for truth is con-
tained in 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970). It is significant that the only initial penalty imposed by this
agency is a cease-and-desist order. Lower courts have occasionally implied that constitutional
protection strictly hinges on whether the commercial expression is "true." See, e.g., L.G.
Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24 (7th Cir. 1971).
-' In Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), Justice Douglas, concurring,
declared:
The profit motive should make no difference, for that is an element inherent in the
very conception of a press under our system of free enterprise. Those who make
their living through exercise of First Amendment rights are no less entitled to its
protection than those whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a profit motive.
Id. at 514.
:6 421 U.S. at 818.
' Without first amendment protection, Bigelow would be an abortion case. Yet the
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The Court noted that the "diverse motives, means, and mes-
sages of advertising may make speech 'commercial' in widely varying
degrees, 581 and invited the lower courts to use the "public-interest"
test coupled with a reasonableness standard to protect or not protect
commercial speech on a case-by-case basis. 59 It is disappointing that
these standards afford little predictability, and even less protection,
for admittedly valid first amendment interests.
A better way to pursue this balancing would have been to follow
the technique used by the district court in Mitchell Family Planning,
Inc. v. City of Royal Oak. 60 On similar facts, the district court held that
a statutory ban on abortion-referral-service advertising was not due
the usual strong presumption of constitutionality because it lfmited
speech. 1 Moreover, initially the court required at least a strong state
interest to override freedom of expression. 62 However, because the
statute had not been narrowly tailored to the state interest,63 the
court further required the government to advance a compelling
state interest to support the statute.64 This analysis more accurately
balances freedom of expression by increasing protection of com-
mercial speech in response to greater governmental infringement.
In comparison, the Bigelow reasonableness standard remains rela-
tively one-sided. Furthermore, by upgrading the protection of
commercial speech, the Mitchell Family Planning analysis increases
the flow of information in the "private sector," which in turn helps to
improve our overall material welfare.
65
abortion cases have been considered as evidencing the resurgence of an active, noneconomic
substantive due process analysis by the Court. See Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159 (1973); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 937-43 (1973).
56 421 U.S. at 826.
59 Id.
60 335 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
61 Id. at 741. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the Court declared that "the
usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our
scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 529-30. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
62 335 F. Supp. at 741. See note 64 infra.
63 335 F. Supp. at 742. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972): "[Sjtatutes
affecting First Amendment interests [must] be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives."
64 335 F. Supp. at 742-43. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court declared:
The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest
in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can
justify limiting First Amendment freedoms .... [A] State may not, under the guise of
prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights.
Id. at 438-39. It is worth noting that Bigelow applied the reasonableness standard to a
prohibition, not a regulation. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
65 See notes 1 & 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
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IV
APPLYING THE COMMERCIAL-SPEECH STANDARDS
The application of the standards developed in Bigelow to a
Virginia publication of a New York abortion referral service adver-
tisement raises doubts about the relevancy and adequacy of these
standards because of the Court's primary focus upon the lack of a
legitimate interest on the part of Virginia, rather than upon the
strength of Bigelow's first amendment interests.
The basic rationale of the Court's decision seems to be that
Virginia could exert no police power over medical care beyond its
borders. 66 Until this case, however, it was clear that a state could
exert some power over activities beyond its borders. 67 For example,
although a broker resides in New York, if he advertises and sells
securities in Virginia, Virginia can require the broker to register for
66 The State, of course, has a legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of medical
care provided within its borders .... No claim has been made, however, that this
particular advertisement in any way affected the quality of medical services within
Virginia. As applied to Bigelow's case, the statute was directed at the publishing of
informative material relating to services offered in another State and was not di-
rected at advertising by a referral agency or a practitioner whose activity Virginia had
authority or power to regulate.
421 U.S. at 827.
67 Justice Rehnquist states in his dissent:
The Court ... relies on Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892), for its
major premise that Virginia could not regulate the relations of the advertiser with its
residents since these occurred in New York. To the extent that the Court reads
Huntington to impose a rigid and unthinking territorial limitation, whose constitu-
tional source is unspecified, on the power of the States to regulate conduct, it is
plainly wrong. The passage referred to by the Court in the Huntington opinion is
dictum and appears to be a statement of then-prevalent common-law rules rather
than a constitutional holding. And the attempt to impose such a rigid limitation on
the power of the States was first rejected by Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court
in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911): "Acts done outside ajurisdiction, but
intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect .... See, e.g.,
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 74-75 (1941); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593,
620-621 (1927). To the extent that the Court's conclusion that Virginia has a negligi-
ble interest in its statute proceeds from the assumption that the State was without
power to regulate the extraterritorial activities of the advertiser involving Virginia
residents, it is quite at war with our prior cases.
421 U.S. at 834 n.2. On this point, Justice Rehnquist has the weight of authority in agreement
with him. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (state has extraterritorial power over
conduct of its citizens on high seas if it can assert legitimate governmental interest not in
conflict with federal regulation); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) (conspiring alien
bootlegger properly seized on high seas because United States has jurisdiction over con-
spiracies with overt act in United States); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911) (state can
punish perpetrator of fraud having impact within its territory despite perpetrator's absence
from state at time of fraud).
It is worth noting that under the Bigelow interpretation of jurisdiction and state police
power, Virginia could not suppress an advertisement by a Nevada brothel. See note 15 supra.
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service of process and to register his sales literature. 68 Similarly,
under established long-arm principles, Virginia can assert jurisdic-
tion over the abortion agency for purposes of tort liability. 69 By
narrowly defining Virginia's interest as concerned with the "health
care within its borders" rather than "the health of Virginia resi-
dents," the Court unnecessarily stripped Virginia of jurisdiction:
Virginia is really asserting an interest in regulating what Virgin-
ians may hear or read about the New York services. It is . . .
advancing an interest in shielding its citizens from information
about activities outside Virginia's borders, activities that Virginia's
police powers do not reach. This asserted interest, even if un-
derstandable, was entitled to little, if any, weight under the cir-
cumstances.
7 0
Clearly, without jurisdiction, any interest asserted by Virginia would
be illegitimate.
The only significant first amendment interest advanced by the
Court in its final balancing is that upholding the statute might give
Virginia undue influence over the content of national magazines
and newspapers, and thus abridge freedom of the press.7 1 However,
this argument obliquely raises interstate commerce questions. Basi-
cally, a state may impose regulations that burden interstate com-
merce only if the burden is outweighed by a health or safety interest
of the state.7 2 In this case, the burden was a prohibition, as opposed
68 Any state can require foreign dealers of securities to register with its Secretary of State
for purposes of guaranteeing service of process and evaluating sales literature. See, e.g., N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw § 359(e), (eee) (McKinney 1968). In the context of a mere reasonableness
standard justifying an absolute prohibition on certain kinds of advertising, however, the
implications here reach much further.
69 See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
70 421 U.S. at 827-28 (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion,
found this to be a legitimate state interest. Id. at 832-36.
71 421 U.S. at 828-29. Also in evidence was a June 1971 issue of Redbook magazine with a
similar advertisement. Id at 814.
72 In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), the Court stated:
Unless we can conclude on the whole record that "the total effect of the law as a safety
measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to
outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interfer-
ences which seriously impede it" . . . we must uphold the statute.
I. at 524, quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945). In Southern
Pacific, the Court announced a broader range of criteria in considering interstate commerce
burdens:
Hence the matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of
the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety mea-
sure, imposes on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of the state
and national interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the rule ... that the
free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
to a regulation.73 Had the Court acknowledged settled law pertain-
ing to extraterritorial jurisdiction, it is clear that in the interest of the
health of its residents, Virginia could have imposed some minimal
regulation on the New York abortion agency. For example, Virginia
could have required the agency to register for service of process, to
register its sales literature, and to be subject to Virginia's malpractice
standards.7 4 However, by implicitly equating regulations and pro-
hibitions and ignoring the settled law on extraterritorial jurisdiction,
the Court has only delayed, and not avoided, dealing with the
interstate commerce questions implicit in Bigelow.75 Moreover, by
emphasizing, in its final analysis, Virginia's lack of jurisdiction, by
diluting the remaining first amendment argument with interstate
commerce aspects, and by ignoring earlier, stronger points made in
favor of commercial speech, the Bigelow Court continues to raise




Bigelow represents the first case to hold squarely that commer-
cial speech is just a factor, and not a dispositive one, in assessing first
amendment protection.7 6 The value of this protection, however, is
quite limited. As previously mentioned, the public-interest test for a
first amendment interest is at best a benevolent censorship, inimical
to the principles of the first amendment,77 and, when coupled with a
requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause
from state interference.
325 U.S. at 770-71.
The criteria for deciding whether or not federal laws will "preempt" the application of
state law altogether are comparable. See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon
of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959). See also Note, Developments in the Law: Deceptive
Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1134-39 (1967).
73 See note 42 supra.
' See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359(e), (eee) (McKinney 1968). See also Watson v.
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). In Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963), discussed in notes 81-83 and accompanying text infra, the
Court rejected the interstate commerce burden claims of a Texas optician prohibited from
advertising in New Mexico. Id. at 429. See note 81 infra.
7- 421 U.S. at 825 n.10. "We need not decide in this case the precise extent to which the
First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may
legitimately regulate or even prohibit." Id. at 825. The Court thus invites lower courts to
balance first amendment interests against governmental interests on a case-by-case basis and
without reference to burdens on interstate commerce.
See id. at 826.
77 See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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reasonableness balancing test,7 8 it is extremely doubtful that there
has been any substantial increment in protection over the harsh
doctrine of Chrestensen. In fact, although the narrow holding of
Bigelow protects a commercial advertisement, it represents a tacit
retreat from the protection afforded such speech in Sullivan and
Pittsburgh Press, because these cases implicitly required the govern-
ment to advance a compelling interest to abridge freedom of expres-
sion.
7 9
The conclusion that Bigelow is meant to be limited to its facts is
reinforced by the Court's refusal to cast doubt on previous inconsis-
tent cases.80 In Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners,81 a New
"8 See notes 46-57 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 10-16 & 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
80 "We have no occasion, therefore, to comment on decisions ... in readily distinguish-
able fact situations. Wholly apart from the respective rationales that may have been developed
... in those cases, their results are not inconsistent with our holding here." 421 U.S. at 825
n.10. In this regard, see notes 81-83 and accompanying text infra.
81 374 U.S. 424 (1963). The Court first examined prohibitions against medical and health
professional advertising in Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608
(1935). The petitioner in Semler had advertised as to the quality, painlessness, and general
efficiency of his work. Citing "bait advertising" by "the charlatan and the quack" and de-
moralization induced by "unseemly rivalries," the Court upheld the Oregon ban on such
promotions. 294 U.S. at 612-13. It should be noted thatSemler concerned an intrastate practice
involving advertising in Oregon by a resident in Oregon. In the next case to consider a similar
fact situation involving opticians, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955), the Court reached the same result. In both cases, however, only equal protection or
due process arguments were advanced, and the first amendment aspects of the problem were
left untouched. In Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963), the first
amendment issues were not raised at the trial level and thus were not before the Supreme
Court. Nevertheless, the Court characterized the situation as involving only a local affair, and
in concurrence, Justice Brennan noted that "nationwide" advertisements could not be re-
stricted by one state. 374 U.S. at 447. Because Head could legally advertise under Texas law,
the interest that New Mexico asserted was identical to that asserted by Virginia in Bigelow:
protecting the health of its citizens by censoring what they "may hear or read" about out-of-
state health services. 421 U.S. at 827 (emphasis in original).
It is questionable whether bans on "professional" advertising retain their originaljustifica-
tions unscathed. As to preventing quacks and charlatans from swindling unsuspecting victims,
it seems that the licensing procedures and sanctions for misuse already provide "less drastic
means" for combating this evil. See note 40 supra. The other justification supporting such a
ban, the prevention of "unseemly competition," has been gravely called into question by
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In that case, a unanimous Court struck
down the minimum fee schedule circulated by the local bar for searching real property titles.
The Court found that such a schedule was in restraint of interstate trade and that lawyers were
not exempted by virtue of a "learned profession" exemption. Id. at 783-92. Given a policy in
favor of competition, the next logical step is advertising. For a comment that examines the
beneficial effects of such a potential development, see Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the
Profession's Duty to Make Legal Services Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1981 (1972). Moreover, a
three-judge court has been convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284 (1970) to consider
whether bar association rules prohibiting lawyer advertising are unconstitutional. Person v.
New York City Bar Ass'n, No. 75 C 987 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 19, 1975). Recently, both doctors
and opticians have also beei brought under pressure to advertize by the FTC. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 7; id., Dec. 24, 1975, at 24, col. 2.
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Mexico radio station was barred from advertising out-of-state opti-
cian services, in accordance with New Mexico's prohibitions against
"professional" advertising. 82 Because this case also involved a health
professional legally advertising under the laws of his home state,
there is no straightforward way to reconcile Head and Bigelow. Such
an inconsistency, expressly preserved, suggests thatBigelow is meant
to be strictly limited to its facts. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist, in dissent,
drew this conclusion:
The Court's opinion does not confront head-on the question
which this case poses, but makes contact with it only in a series of
verbal sideswipes. The result is the fashioning of a doctrine which
appears designed to obtain reversal of this judgment, but at the
same time to save harmless from the effects of that doctrine the
many prior cases of this Court which are inconsistent with it.
8 3
For the advertising industry as a whole, Bigelow may or may not
foreshadow greater state regulation. Although the narrow holding
of Bigelow struck down an advertising ban, the broad dicta concern-
ing "reasonable regulation" amounts to an invitation to the states to
regulate advertisements concurrently.
8 4
One area of law soon to be affected byBigelow involves pharma-
cists' advertising of prescription drug prices. In a case recently
argued before the Supreme Court, Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. v. State Board of Pharmacy,85 Virginia's Board of Pharmacy advo-
cated a ban on such advertising as a means of keeping drug prices
down.8 6 Virginia's consumer union, however, contended that such a
ban violated the consumer's first amendment "right to know" and
that such advertising could not possibly pose a health hazard by
stimulating desire for such drugs because neither the patient nor the
pharmacist has any discretion over their use.8 7 Because a total ban is
involved, as opposed to a reasonable regulation, and because a ban
8' Cf. note 70 and accompanying text supra.
83 421 U.S. at 829-30 (dissenting opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
84 Id. at 826. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
A close reading of Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), suggests that state
action, in the form of a statute legislating lawyers' fee schedules, would not be struck down as
anticompetitive because of the continuing vitality of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
which held state action exempt from the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. at 788-92. This exemption
and Bigelow's "reasonable-regulation" standard may still present serious obstacles to profes-
sional advertising. See note 81 supra.
s5 No. 74-895 (Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 20, 1975). The opinion of the three-judge district court
is reported at 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
86 373 F. Supp. at 686-87.
87 Id. at 685-87.
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on advertising is unlikely to exert a downward pressure on prices,88
the logical result in this case is to find the regulation unreasonable.
Another pharmacist's advertising case, however, may force the
Court to distinguish between regulation and prohibition of advertis-
ing. In Terry v. California State Board of Pharmacy,89 a state statute
required that pharmacists post drug prices in their stores, but pro-
hibited any mass media advertising of such prices in an effort to
combat artificial demand for such drugs, prescription forgery, and
misleading advertisements. Focusing on the consumer's right to
know and the statute's failure to use the least drastic means of
advancing arguably compelling interests, the district court declared
the statute unconstitutional. 90 On appeal, this case will offer the
Supreme Court the opportunity to review its reasonableness balanc-
ing standard and to distinguish regulable from nonregulable adver-
tising for first amendment purposes. Given the Court's willingness
to adopt a more flexible review of commercial speech, thereby pro-
viding "some" protection, and advertising's lack of an effect on
demand for prescription drugs, the only logical result would be for
the Supreme Court to affirm the district court's decision.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Bigelow, it is clear that profit-oriented adver-
tisements, or commercial speech, will now be afforded limited first
amendment protection if these advertisements contain potentially
valuable information. Although this protection may be abridged by
reasonable governmental interests, a state's interest in regulating
advertisements for activities beyond its borders will be held unrea-
sonable where the state's police powers do not reach these activities.
Despite indications thatBigelow is intended to be confined to its facts,
the Court has nevertheless invited the lower courts to use its stan-
dards to examine commercial speech on a case-by-case basis.
In so deciding, the Bigelow Court has given little protection to
admittedly valid first amendment interests. It is not the offensive-
ness of the profit motive that inspires the government to suppress
certain advertisements any more than the presence of "potentially
valuable" information cures the advertisement. Rather, the offen-
.siveness is to be found in the various values of American society that
88 Id.
89 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), appeal pending, No. 75-336 (9th Cir., filed Sept. 2,
1975).
90 Id. at 105-06.
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all advertising merely reflects. Yet, the first amendment insists that
no message be repressed, and its enlightened function is to guaran-
tee the greatest possible diversity of values in our society. Because
commercial speech adds much to this diversity, it should be granted
full, and notjust "some," first amendment protection consistent with
compelling governmental interests.
Eric T. Singer
